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themselves to self-government. For the attainment of his ideal, unlike the Cromwellian who fell back upon the arbitrament of the sword, finding in military success the approving intervention of Providence, the Leveller relied on persuasion, intrusting his propaganda to a party organized on a democratic basis. Though partial to a republican type of government, he could and did accept a monarchy. His ideas come from two sources—the long-standing theory of the English constitution as fundamental law, and the polity of Independency with its impulse toward progress, its respect for divine law, and its use of the Covenant. His influence is to be seen in the idea that citizens have ability to do more than merely carry out the political decisions of their superiors, in the radicalism that has remained as an undercurrent in English politics since the American Revolution, and in the limitation of government by paramount law as manifested in the American Constitution. The author does not find the Leveller's influence in the English Parliament of today, where the "idea of a supreme law that commands their obedience is completely absent, since it may violate the English constitution and there is no constitutional remedy for its act." It is at this point that English students of parliamentary institutions may be disposed to disagree. They will find the spirit of the Leveller in the ever-present solicitude of the Cabinet to conform to public opinion, and in the power of the House of Commons at any moment through an adverse vote to force a change of government.

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AN EXPOSITION OF NIETZSCHE

Dr. Salter deserves the cordial congratulation and thanks of everyone interested in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche for the very careful, very informing, and very timely book which he has given us.¹ The results of a long and diligent research are presented in a lucid, attractive style. The scattered fragments of one of the most dispersive writers who ever lived have been brought together with tireless patience, and the most persevering effort has been put forth to construct out of them an ordered whole. Nietzsche has been made to appear as consistent with himself as it was possible for the most friendly exegesis to make him. Whatever is of value in the long series of works, from *The Birth of Tragedy* to *Ecce Homo*, has been sought out, placed in the most favorable light,

¹*Nietzsche the Thinker*. By William Mackintyre Salter. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917. x+539 pages. \$3.50.

and brought into connection with the surrounding thought of the period. This is the first debt which a critic owes to the notable man whom he has undertaken to exhibit to his public, and Dr. Salter has paid it with scrupulous and exceptional fidelity. Moreover we are supplied with a copious apparatus of references by which each suggested interpretation may be verified at once. It is not too much to say that future writers on the subject will find this book among the most indispensable for their purpose. With special pleasure this tribute is paid at the outset of a review by one who means to dissent very radically indeed from Dr. Salter's general estimate, and who has himself written on Nietzsche from a point of view which is often the polar opposite of that which this book adopts. All competent work in this field is to be welcomed, and it is a special joy to break a lance with so well-equipped an opponent.

It seems unfortunate that Dr. Salter's expository purpose has almost overwhelmed all thought of *criticism*. We are given much help in ascertaining what Nietzsche meant, but little help in deciding how far he meant what is true. His opinions are admirably arranged, classified, developed. But they are very inadequately weighed. A multitude of judgments is reproduced with very slight scrutiny indeed of the tremendous generalizations—anthropological, religious, ethical, historical—upon which these judgments rest and with whose rebuttal they would be rebutted. The generalizations are in many an instance just such as recent inquiry makes the true scholar most diffident about hazarding. The evolution of priesthood and kingship, savage ideas of obligation, the relative place of instinct and reason in early culture, democratic feeling in the primitive church, the ascetic element in the Gospels—each of these is a sphere upon which the learning of our time has cast light, a sphere in which the most learned walk very warily indeed, but in which we can see from many a defiant and abusive paragraph that Friedrich Nietzsche thought it sufficient to be brilliant and needless to be informed. One may surely complain that Dr. Salter has so seldom erected a sign-post to warn his readers of the crazy foundation for social doctrines which Zarathustra did not hesitate to crystallize in an aphorism.

It may be said that the book expressly disclaims a critical purpose, because in the epilogue we are told that it aims to make us understand and leaves us to form our own judgment afterward. An author is, of course, entitled to confine himself to exposition if he chooses. But pure exposition in such a case is not feasible. Criticism is implicit in any such presentation. Coleridge's rule of "experimental faith," which would assume a writer to be coherent until it has been found impossible

to regard him so, is excellent as a preliminary to criticism. But in Dr. Salter's work the revising judgment hardly emerges at all, so that we are left to suppose an internal coherence which was not really there. Nietzsche's discordances are so far as possible smoothed over instead of being set in bold relief, and the effect often reminds one of a Harmony of the Gospels. When he contradicts in one place what he has said in some other place, this is not emphasized, as it ought to have been, to his discredit as a thinker. His apologist inclines to use each extreme view in turn as something to be quoted for the relief of Nietzsche's fame when the other extreme is being urged against him, so that his very inconsistencies are dexterously utilized for his defense. It is plain that such indulgent treatment would absolve any man who had the forethought to insert somewhere in his work the denial of each risky judgment that he had inserted somewhere else.

For example, Nietzsche held that no ethical code can be based on objective reason, and that the codes of aristocrat, priest, and mob are so many instruments in the campaign of each class to get the upper hand. The fundamental human instinct is "will to power," and the sole question to be settled is *whose* will to power shall prevail. The difficulty of such a view is, first, that it seems to reduce altruism and self-denial to an illusion, and, second, that in destroying the objectivity of previous codes by making human nature wholly subject to an impulse that varies rather than a reason that is one and the same it cuts the ground from Nietzsche's own ethic and makes all debate about morals merely psychological. Dr. Salter denies the force of both these objections, but how does he meet them? He points out that for Nietzsche the self-sacrificing parent or philanthropist acts as he does because "his soul is full, over-full, and has to give." "For love may be of two kinds; here a soul is empty and wants to be full; there a soul is overflowing and wants to pour itself out. Both seek an object to satisfy their needs, and really the full soul is as needy and is as much prompted by the sense of need as the empty one—neither is strictly speaking unegoistic." So it turns out that in the end the parent and the philanthropist are unconsciously in cunning pursuit of a more satisfying *state of themselves*, and altruism has in truth been swept away. Yet Dr. Salter seems to think that Nietzsche has thus cleared himself of the very charge which he has admitted. It is surely plain that a human agent in anything he does must alter his own state. But, as the critics of Hobbes pointed out long ago, the question is whether this changed state of himself is that at which he aims. And most of us had thought that Butler's reply, which is equally valid against Nietzsche,

was borne out by all candid introspection. But Dr. Salter does not even notice it. Again, he stoutly denies that the analysis of moral action into "will to power" involves the abandonment of ethics. "We must not be led to think that there is any lack of stringency, whether logical or practical, in the aim when once accepted." And though an objective goal must not be laid down as an authoritative dictum of reason, it may fitly enough be "recommended." But, on Nietzsche's assumptions, how is anyone to "accept" anyone else's aim? What sense is there in "recommending" it to one who is forced by the very law of his being to act solely upon his own will to power? Dr. Salter, who seems to favor the analogy between the moral and the aesthetic judgment, may retort that musical tastes differ, and yet the trained taste may be a criticism upon the untrained. Did not Kant in his last *Critique* use this very fact with success as a proof that a rational element must underlie even our aesthetic preferences? Still more clearly, if reason is tabooed, are we deprived of any criterion by which A's will to power can be judged more worthy than B's. If every man is doomed from his cradle to be an egoist, why waste time in preaching to him the duty of submitting to be a "bridge"? The complaint here made is not of the view which Dr. Salter has taken. It is of his method in leaving us with a mere *exposition* of his author so worked out as to hide rather than to prominently exhibit those respects in which he is vulnerable to attack. The most powerful objections are somewhat perfunctorily cited in brief "Notes" at the end of the volume, where they are often merely stated without being discussed. In truth our author, like most of those who have commended Nietzsche to the public, has involved himself in an embarrassing dilemma. The prophet of superman is either an unsparing iconoclast of Christian morality, or else he is a mere moralist correcting crudenesses, and making us all more thorough in working out with insight our old principles. In the former alternative we must have it explained to us why the "mutilating of millions of men" after the fashion of Napoleon Bonaparte is really better than observance of the Golden Rule, why Kant is to be despised as "the old Chinaman of Königsberg" for his advocacy of peace and Herbert Spencer for daring to hope that some day war would be needless, why the development of transcendent personality in the blond beast is worth effecting through the blood and tears of countless "slaves." If on the other hand Nietzsche had nothing more to give us than some prosaic common sense about pity being apt to defeat its own end, about the occasional need for being cruel that we may be kind, about the deeper humanity which underlies a stern program of eugenics, or about the

lamentable dangers of religious asceticism, then we must ask why the prophet himself plainly thought that he had a root-and-branch affair in hand, why so copious rhetoric was used about applying "dynamite" to the Christian ideals, what, in a word, he can possibly have meant by promising within a short time to "make Europe writhe in convulsions." Dr. Salter oscillates between the two alternatives, and not seldom appears to avail himself of both at once. He would insinuate Nietzsche's doctrine by making it grow naturally out of the past, so that it will not destroy but only fulfil; and at the same time he would vindicate Nietzsche's originality by pointing out how much he has destroyed with a thoroughness that no charity can mistake for fulfilment. In the one mood large liberties have to be taken with the modern conscience, in the other equally large liberties with the Nietzschean text.

Dr. Salter thinks that writers on this subject are being misled by the passions of the war. No doubt he is right in this. But if he had not told us that his own book was in substance complete before the war began there would be ground for a like suspicion of himself, and one may be allowed to think that the additions made "in working over the material subsequently" have not been improvements. It seems probable that to this stage of revision we owe some at least of that singular argument which represents Nietzschean militarism as a high campaign for ideals, and the sort of weapon it approves as spiritual rather than carnal. The present reviewer has encountered nothing like this since he last met with an allegorizing exegesis of the Song of Solomon. Clamors of the hour may mislead a man in two ways. He may exaggerate in order to reinforce them, or he may fall into supersubtleties in order to denounce them. He may be suggestible, or he may be contra-suggestible, and the second is the more usual vice in scholars.

Let no one suppose that the strength of these strictures has proceeded from any judgment on the part of the reviewer that this book is on the whole poor workmanship. On the contrary it is workmanship of great skill, and, one need not say, of quite obvious sincerity. It deserves a place beside the brilliant monograph by Henri Lichtenberger, and is not to be named with the sloppy stuff by writers like Ludovici and Thomas Common whom Dr. Salter in his Preface has mentioned with generous but little-merited respect. It is indeed a perfect mine of information, which an unconscious bias has badly misused but whose value as learning is not thereby lost. Carlyle once laid down the admirable maxim that he who has not first appreciated the degree of truth in a writer's work is thereby disqualified from detecting the degree of his error. This book

is an excellent corrective to those who refuse in judging Nietzsche to pass through the essential stage of appreciation. But a converse maxim of equal value, and perhaps of more immediate urgency to biographers, would bid us remember that only those who are vigilantly critical of a writer's faults can give a discerning and hence an enduring estimate of his merits. With a sincere sense of gratitude to Dr. Salter for his services to Nietzsche scholarship, though not to Nietzsche criticism, let this supplementary canon be brought under his notice.

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BRIEF MENTION

NEW TESTAMENT

KENT, CHARLES FOSTER. *The Shorter Bible. The New Testament.* Translated and arranged with the collaboration of Charles Cutler Torrey, Henry A. Sherman, Frederick Harris, and Ethel Cutler. New York: Scribner, 1918. xix+305 pages. \$1.00.

The task which the authors of this work set themselves was well worth undertaking. They have endeavored to set forth the principal historic facts recorded in the New Testament and its principal teachings stripped of the obstacles to an understanding which are created by an archaic translation and by the inclusion of duplicate accounts of events and of passages which are so closely associated with forgotten or unfamiliar events or thinking as to make little or no appeal to the modern reader. The historical method of study seeks to take the reader back to the times in which the book was written and the event occurred and put them in the position of reading as men of that day read and hearing as they heard. Professor Kent and his associates have aimed to bring the New Testament down to the present day, and as far as possible to put the reader in a position to read it as if it were written yesterday.

Yet with this purpose they have attempted to combine a measure of the historical point of view. Even their Preface betrays this when it says that the book aims to set in *logical* and as far as possible *chronological* order those parts of the Bible which are of vital interest and practical value to the present age. But why chronological? And if the purpose is to give to the reader as much of Paul's thought as is of "practical value to the present age," why try to put in this chronological order those portions of his letters which the book includes? The abbreviation of the book destroys largely the indications of the historic situations out of which they arose. Why then retain a chronological order? Why not indeed drop the names of the people addressed and arrange the selections in a purely logical order calculated to make clear the apostles' general scheme of thought, as had previously been done in the case of Jesus? This is the main thing to be said in adverse criticism of the book. Adopting in the main a modernizing and logical point of view, it nevertheless clings to the historical sufficiently to mar the success of its modernization, but without giving a real chronological view.